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Despite regular and serious systemic volatility, reform of international financial 
architecture  remains  limited,  retaining  market-oriented  characteristics  and 
adjustment mechanisms.  A failure of the architecture to focus on the political 
underpinnings  of  global  financial  and  monetary  governance  yields  crucial 
deficiencies.  The article defends three propositions implying a serious challenge 
to political legitimacy in contemporary financial governance: i) external financial 
constraints conflict with a range of potential domestic, particularly democratic, 
political  imperatives;  ii)  developed  state  initiated  global  financial  integration 
strengthens private interests in the policy process, narrowing the definition of the 
public interest in a democratic context; iii) market-friendly institutional reforms 
put pressure on domestic socio-political arrangements underpinning longer run 
political legitimacy.  The article first analyses norms and legitimacy in global 
financial  governance; then outlines the constraints on public policy of  global 
financial market integration in the light of the foregoing analysis of legitimacy; 
thirdly it discusses possible solutions. 
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Over the past two decades, from the 1980s debt crisis to currency and financial 
crises of 1997-2002, the global economy has experienced regular episodes of 
monetary  and  financial  instability.    The  fallout  manifested  itself  in  monetary 
disruptions  and  capital  flight  to  developed  economies,  repressed  investment 
activities  and  considerable  loss  of  GDP.  Unemployment  often  rose  to 
unprecedented heights and the income of a wide range of social groups declined 
sharply, leading to social instability and political unrest. This raised financial 
crises and the socio-political costs associated with them to the top of the policy 
agenda in international organisations and national governments.  There was a 
considerable period following the outbreak of the Peso and Asian Crises when 
more  or  less  radical  reforms  of  global  financial  architecture  were  urgently 
discussed. 
Although taming capital flows and maintaining systemic stability now ranks 
as one of the priorities of global economic governance, both debate and reform 
focused largely on technical deficiencies (Eichengreen 1999; Goldstein 2001).  
The  current  architecture  governing  global  financial  and  monetary  relations—
institutions, structures and policies—was crafted by the US Treasury, the G-7 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the limited nature of the reforms 
reflects the preferences of an alliance of the official national and multilateral 
agencies  of  financial  and  monetary  governance  with  powerful  transnational 
market players based in these highly developed economies, which have so far  
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avoided the consequences of financial and monetary instability experienced by 
developing  economies.    The  reformed  system  centres  on  facilitating  and 
clarifying market signals through policy transparency, institutional reforms/good 
governance, flexible exchange rate management, private-sector involvement in 
crisis resolution, and debt restructuring.
1  A recent discussion concerning the 
distribution of quota and voting in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
has opened (IMF 2006a, 2006b), which may yield results in September 2006. 
The current period of calm provides an appropriate moment for reflection on 
the nature of contemporary financial governance and its potential weaknesses.
2  
This article argues that the largely apolitical and positive nature of reform has 
served to obfuscate crucial dimensions of policy that underlie the modesty of 
efforts to improve the governance of global financial and monetary relations. 
Technical adjustments in regulatory standards, debt restructuring schemes and 
exchange  rate  regimes  are  contingent  upon  domestic  and  international 
configurations  of  interests  and  power.  Architectural  reform  is  not  only  about 
policy-making and regulatory  or economic efficacy but, in the  final analysis, 
about the enhancement of social and economic conditions and is about financial 
stability for whom and for what. 
The limitations of reform lie in a general failure to address the political and 
normative  underpinnings  of  global  financial  governance,  about  which  both 
academic  and  particularly  policy-making  circles  have  been  too  silent.
3  This 
corresponds to a failure to address the emerging legitimacy deficit of financial 
governance, as a number of states and regions have begun to “check-out” of 
‘capital mobility hotel’ constituted by the IFIs, choosing regional or domestic  
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solutions to the problem.  Asian countries have paid off their IMF debts and built 
up  massive  reserves,  leaving  themselves  free  of  IFI  conditionality  in  future 
crises.  The electorates of a range of Latin America countries have signalled their 
ongoing frustration with norms of global economic governance and the results it 
apparently  achieves,  and  financial  instability  has  played  an  important  role  in 
these  developments.    This  leaves  a  rump  of  poor,  mainly  African  countries 
dependent  on  the  system,  submitting  to  policies  they  played  little  part  in 
designing.  The multilateral financial architecture as a mechanism of governance 
is under severe threat.  The risk is that as financial crises fade in our memory, 
complacency has become a palliative for the genuine loss of direction in the 
further reform of the global financial regime.   
The  principal  claim  is  that  enhanced  effectiveness  and  legitimacy  of  the 
reforms lies in the explicit consideration and incorporation in the reform process 
of  the  political  and  normative  prerequisites  that  are  an  integral  but  seldom 
discussed part of global financial architecture.  This article therefore analyses the 
underlying dimensions that sustain the international financial order in relation to 
three  different  but  interrelated  propositions.  First,  the  tension  between  what 
national policy makers are required to do in a democratic context and what they 
can  actually  do  in  the  face  of  global  financial  constraints  has  shaken  public 
confidence,  perhaps  in  the  democratic  form  of  governance  itself.    Second, 
financial globalisation has strengthened the position of private actors, rendered 
regulators  and  supervisors  more  dependent  on  private  market  interests  and 
contributed to the emergence of closed policy networks.  These changes, most 
often encouraged by states themselves (Helleiner 1994; Underhill 1997), have  
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increasingly aligned financial policy and regulatory processes to the preferences 
of powerful market players, crucially altering the notion of the public interest in 
relation to the financial domain and posing a fundamental problem of exclusion 
and  democratic  accountability.    Third,  institutional  reforms  along  market-
friendly lines, propelled by the transnationalisation of financial markets, have 
threatened to destabilise the complex socio-political arrangements that underpin 
the contrasting forms of capitalist development and to undermine the established 
basis  of  democratic  credibility  associated  with  these  forms.    All  three 
propositions  imply  a  serious  legitimacy  deficit  in  the  mode  and  content  of 
governance. 
These propositions are developed in three steps. First, the article will analyse 
the literature on legitimacy and norms as applied to the national and global levels 
of governance, defining what is meant by legitimacy in this context and how it 
might  be  conceptualised  across  levels  of  governance.    Using  the  standard 
distinction of the input versus the output side, the piece will argue that while an 
outcome  perceived  as  broadly  legitimate  is  the  ultimate  test,  a  better  policy 
process on the input side is more likely to lead to such an outcome, including a 
reassessment  of  the  underlying  policy  norms  themselves.    Thus  the  article 
acknowledges that global-level governance can contribute to resolving some of 
the dilemmas which confront national governance, though this is contingent on 
explicit recognition that the reform of the emerging multi-level system of global 
financial governance presents policy problems in terms of norms and legitimacy.  
In the second section, an analysis is provided of the current dilemmas that the 
international financial system poses to public policy, in particular at the national  
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level, assessing the often polarised literature as subtly and fairly as possible.  In 
light of the discussion in section one, the article goes on to demonstrate that 
these dilemmas are a problem for the legitimacy of the financial governance at 
national and global levels, dilemmas not successfully addressed by the official 
consensus on the current financial architecture.  The policies advanced under the 
current architecture have strong but implicit underlying norms which need direct 
acknowledgement.    If  the  issue  of  legitimacy  and  these  underlying  norms  is 
directly  considered  in  the  reform  debate,  then  the  question  of  inclusion  and 
representation in the policy process, as well as the content and implementation of 
policies, will come under closer scrutiny.  Answers need to be found to questions 
as  yet unaddressed by the reforms: what is the relationship between national 
development  aspirations  and  the  obligations  of  international  adjustment 
processes? For whom and for what is financial governance to be reformed, and 
with what sort of distributional impact? The third section advances a range of 
political and normative prerequisites for successful reform of global financial 
governance.  The conclusion will summarise the claims and arguments and will 
take up the three propositions once again in light of the analysis.   
 
I. Norms and Legitimacy in Global Governance 
The frequency and severity of financial crises have both reinforced the argument 
that the global economy is poorly governed (Held and McGrew 2000; Murphy 
2000)  and  deepened  the  need  for  understanding  the  nature  of  global-level 
governance. While scholars have not reached a consensus on the connotation of 
global governance, they have all concurred that the term refers to the manner in  
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which rules are made and power is exercised, without centralised authority, in 
the  management  of  strategic  interactions  among  various  entities  for  realising 
collective goals. This definition has a conceptual emphasis on the importance of 
steering the various multi-level entities towards shared rules and an empirical 
understanding that those subject to the process of global governance accept these 
rules as authoritative (Finkelstein 1995; Keohane 2002; Rosenau 1995). What 
underpins  this  notion  of  global  governance  is  a  normative  implication  that 
governance without government should be based on legitimate rules and that 
rules are only legitimate if they conform to widely acceptable values and norms 
(Bernstein 2004; Keohane 2002). 
Legitimacy  is  an  elusive  concept  in  the  best  of  circumstances.    A  rough 
definition illustrates the point: political legitimacy consists in satisfying enough 
of the people enough of the time.  It is difficult to establish with precision when a 
policy or regime is legitimate, for how many of those affected, and therefore if 
legitimacy is present. Yet if and when it fails to materialise or vanishes, political 
problems  and  potential  breakdown  soon  follow.
4    A  more  formal  definition 
demonstrates  similar  difficulties:  legitimacy  is  “…a  property  of  a  rule  or 
rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those 
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution 
has  come  into  being  and  operates  in  accordance  with  generally  accepted 
principles of right process (Franck 1990: 24).”  As Weber clearly established, it 
has to do with the vagaries of perception in a collective setting: “legitimacy is 
the perception of legitimacy” (Mather 1999, 277), and Weber goes onto explore 
conditions  under  which  legitimacy  might  be  established  as  a  result  of  legal,  
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traditional, or  charismatic authority (Weber 1978, 215 check source if  p. no. 
correct).    A  useful  discussion  by  Bernstein  establishes  that  in  this  sense, 
legitimacy is concerned with the social construction of intersubjective beliefs in 
a  defined  community,  and  that  at  least  insofar  as  forms  of  (democratic) 
accountability of rulers to ruled prevail, legitimacy will be rooted in accepted 
norms of social justice and truth (Bernstein 2004, 14-16; see also Steffek 2000).  
It  should  be  noted  that  the  notion  of  a  defined  community  is  inherently 
problematic in terms of the multiple and overlapping layers of global financial 
governance, a point which will be taken up later in the discussion.   
 This leads to a further distinction in the literature, that between the use of 
power  to  achieve  compliance,  and  authority,  which  involves  some  degree  of 
consent  and  thus  legitimacy  (Lindblom  1977,  17-32).    Power  leading  to 
acquiescence  in  particular  regimes  or  policies  does  not  constitute  legitimacy 
unless  the  norms  and  the  policies  in  which  they  manifest  themselves  are 
perceived by the community as authoritative, and that they can be justified in 
terms of shared beliefs (Beetham 1991, 11).  Power relationships are therefore 
strongest when they are based on shared, therefore legitimate, norms and beliefs 
based on defensible notions of justice in a collective context.  These norms may 
well be self-interested, reinforcing their authoritative nature, though legitimacy is 
more genuinely present when outcomes are accepted despite being in conflict 
with the self interest of individuals or groups, perhaps a substantial segment of 
the community. 
Legitimacy,  then,  confers  on  individuals  and  institutions  the  authority  to 
make rules and exercise power within a given domain of activity, and is crucial  
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to effective national or  global level  governance.  Motivating states and other 
entities  to  accept  and  follow  domestic  or  international  rules  through  the 
legitimate  exercise  of  authority  is  likely  to  be  a  superior  alternative  to  other 
mechanisms such as coercion and self-interest.  Legitimacy contributes to the 
acceptance of shared rules and thus governance processes by providing political 
communities with moral incentives or ‘internal reasons’ for compliance.  When 
states and their citizens believe that rules are legitimate, they are motivated to 
comply with these rules by an internal sense of obligation rather than by the fear 
of retribution or by a  calculation of self interests which are more costly  and 
whose effects tend to be ephemeral (Hurd 1999).  
These notions of political legitimacy are of course most often discussed in 
direct relation to national states, where the notion of political community and 
shared  beliefs  is  usually  well-established.    Here,  use  may  be  made  of  David 
Easton’s (1965) extensive account of legitimacy, where he distinguishes three 
interrelated aspects of the problem: political community, regime, and authorities 
(Easton  1965,  165).    A  given  political  community  may  be  perceived  as 
legitimate, and in turn may distinguish between the legitimacy of the regime 
broadly defined, versus the legitimacy of its particular (temporary) occupants, 
the authorities.  Support for these three elements of political legitimacy can be 
further  divided  into  a)  specific  support,  by  which  he  means  performance 
satisfaction in the short term (p. 265), wherein the system will fail some or all 
constituents some or all of the time, and b) diffuse support (p. 273), which is not 
dependent on short-term performance and if underpinned by an emergence of 
common  interests  and  mutual  accommodation  constitutes  a  sort  of  long-run  
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reserve  on  which  the  political  legitimacy  of  authorities  and  regimes  may  be 
based and draw.  The point here is that over time a viable political community 
may emerge wherein the legitimacy of community and regime remains intact 
despite occasional or perhaps frequent dissatisfaction with the performance of 
particular authorities occupying the regime. 
Common  to  the  approaches  analysed  above  is  an  understanding  that 
efficiency  and  democracy  are  two  mutually  reinforcing  dimensions  of 
legitimacy; only when the two are combined in a balanced manner can specific 
governance processes be legitimated over the long run.  So far these accounts 
also  focus  largely  on  the  domestic  level  of  analysis.    Easton’s  account  of 
legitimacy in domestic political systems may be contrasted with the problem of 
legitimacy  in  a  situation  of  global  governance  which  takes  place  across 
overlapping multiple layers of institutions (national, regional, global), wherein 
the  sense  of  political  community  and  its  acceptable  shared  norms  is  much 
weaker, the “regime” much more difficult to define, and “authorities” are spread 
unevenly  across  different  layers  of  governance,  depending  on  the  state  or 
community  in  question.    In  other  words,  institutions  are  weaker  and  more 
ephemeral,  often  recent  in  creation,  and  there  is  no  underlying  transnational 
community to match the transnational nature of governance and the problems 
with which it seeks to cope (Zürn 2004, 260).  Decision-making processes are 
often more distant from traditional systems of (democratic) accountability, which 
may be seriously underdeveloped as a result.  Cross-border economic and policy 
integration may furthermore disturb political communities and their norms and 
render regimes and authorities less efficient at coping with the demands of their  
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constituencies and producing a satisfactory reserve of legitimacy.  Finally, this 
all  means  that  there  is  unlikely  to  be  much  in  the  way  of  Easton’s  diffuse 
legitimacy.  Global governance will be far more reliant upon performance and 
outcome, Easton’s notion of specific support. 
Thinking about legitimacy in the context of multi-level global governance 
therefore  requires  some  adaptation  of  these  concepts.    Legitimacy  at  the 
international  level  is  most  frequently  and  not  surprisingly  considered  as  an 
extension of state sovereignty (Bernstein 2004, p. 3; Bull 1977), wherein state 
membership of international institutions and governance processes assumes that 
legitimacy is directly embedded in domestic political communities and regimes.  
However, where some states are more influential than others, and where lines of 
accountability and influence are not necessarily direct or clear, and where, as 
mentioned,  responsibilities  and  competences  in  terms  of  governance  are 
distributed across layers of institutions, this traditional conception is problematic.  
Furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between states and the people or 
constituencies they allegedly represent in international institutions.  Some states 
are notoriously bad at representing their people, a considerable hindrance to the 
emergence  of  a  sense  of  community  and  shared  acceptable  norms.    One  is 
tempted  to  argue  that  legitimacy  will  always  remain  obscure  and  necessarily 
problematic in such a context, but the literature does allow one to disengage a 
helpful analysis.  
In the first place, while this article has claimed and will establish that cross-
border integration and the development of global governance pose considerable 
problems for the legitimacy at the national level, it may also work the other way  
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around.  A standard observation on international co-operation demonstrates the 
point:  regional  or  global  level  governance  helps  to  resolve  collective  action 
problems experienced by members of the international system, and to provide 
the collective goods which states acting individually cannot ensure.  As Zürn has 
argued,  “…international  institutions  give  back  to  national  policy  makers  the 
capacity to deal effectively with denationalized economic structures.  Seen thus, 
international  institutions  are  not  the  problem,  but  part  of  the  solution  to  the 
problems confronting democracy in the age of globalization” (2004, p. 286).  
Thus the fact that governance is spread across layers of institutions is not per 
se  the  problem.    The  problem  is  the  accountability  and  legitimacy  of  such 
arrangements  and  (eventually)  their  link  to  democracy.    An  analogy  with 
federalism  helps  one  realise  that  sometimes  the  legitimacy  of  governance, 
especially  of  an  acceptable  sense  of  community  (Easton),  is  contingent  upon 
spreading governance across layers of institutions.  It may be concluded that as 
long as global integration continues apace, legitimacy is unlikely to be enhanced 
without  a  more  multi-layered  system  of  global  governance.    The  point  is  to 
establish  institutions  in  such  a  way  as  to  maximise  sense  of  community,  of 
accountability,  of  the  norms  of  social  justice,  thus  to  enhance  linkages  to 
traditional  democracy.    Here  one  might  borrow  the  distinction  between 
delegation of authority to regional or global levels, and its transfer (Kahler and 
Lake  2003,  9-10).    While  legitimacy  under  conditions  of  delegation  may  be 
ensured  through  a  direct  link  to  sovereign  state  membership  of  the  process, 
transfer certainly requires more robust attention to the inherent difficulties of 
legitimacy in a cross-border context.  
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If  on  this  basis  the  proposition  that  ‘global  governance  is  doing 
internationally what governments do at home’ (Finkelstein 1995, 369) can be 
accepted, there is a strong reason to draw an analogy with domestic political 
processes in which legitimacy is a basic feature of democratic rule and provides 
the  normative  underpinning  for  national  governance.  While  domestic  and 
international legitimacy may have different bases and patterns (Franck 1990), the 
legitimacy of global governance rests primarily on broad democratic principles 
(Held  1995;  Nye  2001)  which  are  not  dissimilar  to  the  underpinnings  of 
legitimacy at the domestic level. 
This last point invokes a conceptual understanding that legitimacy at all the 
levels  of  governance  should  be  defined  relative  to  the  beliefs  and  values 
embedded  in  democratic  political  processes  (Beetham  1991).    Legitimacy 
defined  in  this  sense  suggests  that  the  rules  of  global  governance  can  be 
maintained only if states and their societies accept these rules as legitimate, to be 
obeyed voluntarily.  Legitimacy exists and persists in the international system 
when  processes  and  outcomes  conform  sufficiently  to  a  prevailing  system  of 
norms. Furthermore, the acceptance of international rules can be facilitated and 
global governance improved if governments and transnational actors believe in 
the legitimacy of the rules and of the bodies and organisations that generate these 
rules.  This reinforces the above proposition that legitimacy not only relates to 
the exercise of authority through democratic processes but also is contingent on 
the appropriateness of rules and standards that should be compatible with the 
existing specification of norms and values.  
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The  legitimacy  of  global  governance  can  therefore  stem  from  the 
effectiveness of international institutions in providing global collective goods. In 
a democratic context, however, the legitimate authority to make and interpret 
rules  should  rest,  first  and  foremost,  on  the  institutionalised  procedures  and 
norms that are widely perceived as fair and just (Keohane and Nye 2001).  This 
leads  to  the  distinction  between  the  input  and  output  sides  of  legitimacy  in 
national and international governance (Scharpf 1999; Wolf 2002). The input side 
refers to the extent to which the process of making political choices reflect the 
actual preferences of the community once defined.  Input thus has to do with the 
way in which the interests of the broader community are included or represented 
in the policy-making process.  The output side concerns results: the capacity of 
governance to produce outcomes which resolve problems and achieve collective 
goals in line with accepted and shared norms of the community. 
It is argued that there is an uneasy relationship between the two.   If the 
output  is  perceived  as  legitimate,  it  might  not  matter  what  the  process  was.  
Authoritarian regimes can produce consistently legitimate outcomes, at least for 
a time (dependent on the content of belief systems).  Likewise, poor outcomes 
may undermine a legitimate process (financial crisis cannot always be the result), 
and  the  most  legitimate  process  conceivable  may  consistently  produce  poor 
results  which  undermine  diffuse  legitimacy,  whether  related  to  circumstances 
that decision-makers can meaningfully influence or not.  It should be noted that 
in a situation of global governance, where the sense of community and locus of 
authority  is  weakly  defined,  output  (or  performance,  Easton’s  specific 
legitimacy) is likely to be particularly important.  That said, a highly legitimate  
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(democratic) process with input from those who bear the costs of decisions is 
more likely to lead to acceptance of poor  results over time, especially  if the 
situation admits of little influence by decision-makers.  A combination of both is 
most likely to contribute to strengthening diffuse legitimacy for institutions of 
governance  and  the  occupants  of  positions  of  authority  within  a  defined 
community.  A final proposition, important for this discussion of global financial 
governance, is that a more inclusive and legitimate process which represents a 
broad  range  of  interests  on  the  input  side  is  more  likely  to  lead  to  results 
embedded in norms which are perceived as legitimate on the output side.  In 
such a situation, conflicting norms more likely to be discussed and dealt with; 
better input will make it easier to enhance authoritative nature of even failed 
decisions.  Process and interaction on the input side is closely linked to how the 
sense of community is defined, and over time should help emergence of sense of 
community with an accepted set of norms around particular issues. 
On  the  basis  of  this  last  proposition,  it  will  be  argued  below  that 
strengthening the legitimacy of the input side of global financial governance is a 
reasonable starting point for improvement.   One further point  concerning the 
input  side  should  be  made,  however.    Strengthening  input  legitimacy  of  the 
process implies sound representation of the broad diversity of interests in the 
defined,  if  rather  diverse,  community,  in  this  case  of  states  and  societies  at 
various  levels  of  development  within  the  global  financial  architecture.    Thus 
better  representation  is  one  way  to  enhance  input  legitimacy.    This  means 
recognising  the  various  principles  of  representation  which  are  available  to  
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institutions of governance.  These principles of representation sometimes conflict 
with and sometimes complement each other. 
The most obvious principle is one person, one vote (unwieldy in a global 
context), or one member (state) one vote.  But members of institutions may be of 
differing economic and political import, leading to the principle of representing 
members differentially according to e.g. wealth, population, or territory.  That 
some members contribute more resources to institutions than others, voluntarily 
or according to the rules, gives rise to the idea of a “shareholder principle” of 
representation  related  to  the  “property”  or  proportional  stake  held  by  a 
participant,  a  principle  in  conflict  with  one  member,  one  vote.    Yet  another 
principle is the representation of those whose common interests derive from the 
fact they are most affected by decisions, such as the users of services (e.g. by 
monopoly  providers),  or  debtors.    A  derivation  of  this  in  some  contexts  is 
interest-based or “corporatist” representation, where important and identifiable 
groups in the community are represented on the basis of their common interests 
vis à vis other competing constituencies.  Finally one may invoke the principle of 
minority representation, where the purpose is to compensate the weak and to 
grant  them  a  formal  role  in  decision-making  (Dorenspleet  2001).    Processes 
which  systematically  exclude  may  be  legitimate  to  a  broad  majority  of  the 
community, but can be prone to serious breakdown if coherent minorities rebel.  
The  most  important  point  here  is  that  most  systems  of  governance  at  the 
domestic or international level employ a mix of these principles depending on the 
context.  
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Returning one last time to the output side, political communities measure 
outcomes  in  a  variety  of  ways  depending  on  their  systems  of  shared  beliefs.  
Some shared norms may conflict openly with others, rendering tradeoffs among 
norms necessary, while others may more easily overlap compatibly.  In relation 
to  financial  governance,  some  may  prefer  stability,  others  risk.  Long  run 
development  and  growth  may  be  an  accepted  norm,  perhaps  rendered  more 
difficult by preferences for social justice and reasonable distributional outcomes.  
One point is certain: claims to legitimacy are stronger in more coherent political 
communities.  If outcomes are persistently unacceptable to a wide spectrum of 
the  global  or  regional  community  involved  in  multi-level  arrangements,  then 
these regional or global mechanisms of governance will quickly be depleted of 
any accumulated legitimacy and may be fatally weakened.  Local or national 
level  communities  may  assert  their  claims  more  vigorously,  leading  to  a 
decentralisation of governance which further undermines the capacity of national 
authorities either to cope with the problems of global integration or to commit to 
global governance, reformed or otherwise (Hiscox and Lake 2002, Garrett and 
Rodden 2003).  
The stakes may be high.  Extrapolating to the current state of global financial 
governance, both the input and output elements of legitimacy will be revealed as 
highly problematic and based on norms that are at variance with the political and 
economic imperatives of developing and emerging market countries in an era of 
transition  to  democracy,  in  some  cases  developed  countries  as  well.    As  the 
dilemmas of global financial integration have been confronted, key aspects of 
international financial policy-making have become anchored in a discourse of  
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de-politicised  technocracy  that  increasingly  deviates  from  a  range  of  norms 
compatible with democracy and which in large part reflects the preferences of an 
alliance between public and private financiers.  The next section analyses the 
dilemmas  and  constraints  presented  by  global  financial  integration  and 
contemporary  financial  governance,  and  then  relates  the  current  financial 
architecture to the problem of legitimacy. 
 
II. Global Structures, National Imperatives, and the Legitimacy of 
Financial Governance 
 
This section supports the claim that the current global financial system exerts 
considerable pressure on national level policy-makers, creating dilemmas which 
conflict with a range of domestic political imperatives and render governance 
and policy-making more difficult.  Secondly, this section will demonstrate how 
these  constraints  constitute  problems  for  the  legitimacy  of  contemporary 
financial governance at both national and global levels.  The analysis will fall 
under three headings: the general constraints of capital mobility on the autonomy 
of  national  macroeconomic  and  social  welfare  policies;  the  changing  balance 
between  public  and  private  interests;  and  the  harmonising  pressures  of  the 
system on national models of capitalism.  
 
1. Capital mobility and political legitimacy 
Capital mobility, as an increasingly prominent feature of the global economic 
order  (Eichengreen  and  Fishlow  1998;  IMF  1993),  has  limited  governments’ 
ability  to  make  independent  macro-economic  decisions  concerning  fiscal, 
monetary  and  exchange  rate  policies.    In  an  environment  of  high  capital  
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mobility,  autonomous  macro-economic  strategies  relative  to  domestic 
imperatives require the sacrifice of exchange-rate stability, the degree dependent 
on the more vulnerability of the economy.  Conversely, an independent exchange 
rate target may be maintained only at the cost of reduced control over monetary 
policy.  Attempts by governments to affect national economic performance by 
following  monetary  policies  diverging  from  international  trends  can  lead  to 
balance-of-payments  disequilibrium,  speculative  attacks  and  exchange  rate 
volatility (Andrews 1994; Kahler 1998; Webb 1991).  
Financial integration affects in particular those national political economies 
reliant  on  external  funds,  most  often  those  at  various  stages  of  a  long-run 
development  process.  To  benefit  from  foreign  capital,  they  must  provide  a 
sufficiently  attractive  policy  framework  with  a  view  to  increasing  market 
confidence  in  their  economic  policy  (Haley  2001;  Scharpf  1991).  Seeking 
currency stability also reflects the desire of governments to avoid inflationary 
expectations which may lead market players to behave in ways that harm the real 
economy. As a result, there has been a tendency for policy to converge towards 
an agenda set by financial markets, with governments focusing more and more 
on exchange rate and monetary stability rather than other policy goals (Cerny 
1996; Mosley 2003), with fiscal policy bearing the brunt of the resulting anti-
inflationary stance. The prospects of rising inflationary pressures and currency 
instability associated with deficit financing are  powerful disincentives against 
government attempts to run generous public spending programmes and counter-
cyclical budget deficits.   
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These constraints lead to claims that financial integration has constrained the 
capacity of national states to provide the redistributive public goods associated 
with  the  social  welfare  state  (Cerny  1995,  1996).  While  the  literature  has 
produced inconsistent results on this front,
5 broad evidence that emerges from 
empirical  case  studies  seems  to  confirm  the  validity  of  the  claim  that  such 
policies are more difficult though not impossible.  In many OECD countries, 
independent  exchange  rate  policy  has  lost  its  role  despite  amplified  risks  of 
speculative attack while rising deficits circumscribe fiscal policy options.  With 
national  policies  more  constrained  by  financial  market  sentiment,  pressures 
increase for cutbacks in public service spending and for the reversal of welfare 
policies  traditionally  associated  with  social  democracy  (Cerny  1999;  Moses 
1994, 1995; Rhodes 1998).  
While financial globalisation has made it difficult for governments to sustain 
social  welfare  policies,  the  same  structural  forces  subject  broad  segments  of 
society to increasing market risks and dislocations and heightened feelings of 
economic  insecurity  (Agénor  and  Aizenman  1998;  Dailami  2000;  Stiglitz 
2003b), thus augmenting political demands for enhanced social insurance and 
welfare spending.  Furthermore, although financial integration tends to benefit 
holders  of  mobile  assets  and  enhances  their  ability  to  hedge  against  market 
volatility, it generally leads to welfare losses of internationally immobile factors 
of production, such as domestically-oriented firms, labour and agriculture. This, 
together  with  reduced  government  intervention  in  market  activities,  has 
contributed to growing income inequality among different social groups within 
countries.
6  
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While developed countries generally have not reduced the overall weight of 
welfare spending in the economy, large and rising public deficits have raised 
serious doubts about the sustainability of such spending (Garrett 2000, 123-5) 
and has contributed to a series of welfare state reforms.  Governments perceive 
genuine political difficulties in raising taxes to match demands for spending in 
the context of financial integration.  This has allowed business and finance to 
move with relative ease across borders and renders an important source of tax 
revenues  precarious  (Rodrik  1997b;  Rodrik  and  van  Ypersele  1999;  Steinmo 
1994;  Williamson  2003).
7  This  perceived  possibility  of  arbitrage  amongst 
regulatory  and  tax  regimes  points  to  the  difficulties  governments  have 
experienced in deploying redistributive taxation and welfare programmes. 
Here  there  is  an  important  and  clear  distinction  between  developed 
economies,  to  whom  Mosley’s  “room  to  move”  (2000)  clearly  applies,  and 
(especially poor) developing countries, as encapsulated by the notion of “original 
sin.”
8  The marked decline in governmental receipts in many developing and 
emerging market countries suggest that they have experienced growing difficulty 
in imposing a stronger taxation on private capital, as it has become increasingly 
mobile and powerful against the backdrop of continued market-friendly reforms 
(Grunberg  1998;  Stiglitz  2003b).    Resort  to  deficits  as  alternative  sources  of 
finance pose the risk of destabilising the macro-economy and deterring private 
investment capital, so these states have been opted for cuts in welfare spending 
(Rudra 2002). Increasingly caught in the 'double bind' of growing pressures on 
public  budgets  and  declining  capacities  to  raise  revenues  (Grunberg  1998), 
developing states are less able efficiently to deliver welfare services and alleviate  
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the  restructuring  pains.  Just  when  global  financial  integration  has  subjected 
domestic social groups to market dislocations, the ability of states to provide 
insurance against such dislocations has been weakened. 
States themselves have in large measure authored these trends, with reforms 
in policy and state structures constraining the fulfilment of popular demands for 
compensation against the costs of global market integration.
9 While talk of the 
rollback  the  role  of  the  state  is  thus  misdirected,  the  process  has  altered  the 
balance of power between different state agencies, with significant implications 
for  policy-making  (Evans  1997;  Sbragia  2000).  Ministries  that  traditionally 
derived their bureaucratic power from the provision and management of welfare 
programmes have seen their position gradually decline in the continued process 
of privatisation and deregulation, whereas central banks and finance ministries 
have  been  increasing  their  power  within  the  hierarchy  of  state  agencies.  
Cautious about expensive social programmes, they are among the prime movers 
in the transformation of the welfare state for at least three reasons: they worry 
about the impact of fiscal policy on macroeconomic policy; they aim to ensure a 
positive climate for inward investment; and to avoid the negative impact of such 
programmes  on  the  interests  of  their  private  constituencies  in  the  financial 
community.    As  these  “non-majoritarian  institutions”  (Majone  1997)  have 
become  more  powerful  and  independent,  the  trend  has  both  limited  the 
institutional  resources  of  and  weakened  the  political  coalitions  which 
underpinned  social  protection  against  the  often  destabilising  forces  of  global 
markets.  
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In  short,  the  capital  mobility  associated  with  the  contemporary  financial 
system is a source of important limitations on the policy-making autonomy of 
states.  Global financial integration has had consequences for state capacity in 
relation to a range of policies generally associated with the political stability and 
legitimacy of national governments.  These difficulties have a particular impact 
on developing countries.   
This  tension  between  transnational  financial  constraints  and  growing 
domestic  demands  poses  questions  for  political  legitimacy,  in  particular  the 
output side.  States cannot consistently achieve results which correspond to the 
accepted norms of governance of their national communities.  Given that the 
practice of legitimate governance is deeply rooted in (democratic) states as self-
contained  units,  the  input  side  of  legitimacy  is  also  engaged.    Overall,  the 
capacity  to  implement  policies  deemed  necessary  to  ensure  their  political 
legitimacy in a democratic context is assumed (Coleman and Underhill 1998, 5-
11; Held 1991; 1995, 3-23).  Citizens hold authorities accountable for what they 
cannot  fully  deliver,  with  expectations  becoming  stronger  as  financial 
globalisation subjected a wide range of social groups to market dislocations and 
as democracy spread and consolidated in developed and developing countries.   
The  traditional  concept  of  democracy  has  therefore  been  rendered 
problematic by the  global scope of markets, which limit the competence and 
effectiveness  of  national  political  authorities  (Held  1995,  127-34;  Held  and 
McGrew  1993,  268-71).    Governments  in  most  advanced  industrial  countries 
have  begun  to  lose  credibility  with  the  majority  of  the  population  as  they 
experience increasing difficulty acting in the interests and on the desires of their  
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citizens (Cerny 1999; Pharr, Putman and Dalton 2000). The problem is most 
acute  in  recently  democratised  political  economies,  including  those  emerging 
from  communism  (Freyberg-Inan  2006).    In  many  developing  and  emerging 
market  countries,  the  accentuation  of  already  considerable  socio-economic 
inequalities has led to dangerous pressures on emerging democratic governance 
(Armijo 2001; Karl 2000, 149-56).
10  
As  argued  above,  shifting  governance  to  the  regional  or  global  level  is  a 
possible  solution  to  these  dilemmas,  yet  the  existing  international  financial 
architecture falls short.  The norms and policies that constitute the new financial 
architecture have remained largely oriented toward upholding the virtues of free 
capital mobility (Armijo 2001; Soederberg 2001) rather than offering states the 
means  of  attenuating  the  difficulties  it  presents.    While  the  sequencing  of 
financial and capital account liberalisation is seen as important, the goal remains 
the  same  despite  recognition  of  “original  sin.”    The  process  leading  to  this 
outcome is problematic here, dominated by the combined resistance of the US 
government, international investors and powerful domestic market players who 
have identified their political and economies interests with continued financial 
liberalisation  and  untrammelled  capital  movements  (Cohen  2003;  Soederberg 
2001).    Discussions  about  the  impact  of  capital  mobility  on  democratic 
development in emerging market countries have been totally absent from the 
official rhetoric on the reform of global financial architecture.  G-7 governments 
and international financial institutions tend to view global finance as involving 
highly  technical  and  private  transactions  that  should  be  isolated  from  the 
uncontrollable process of democracy (Porter 2001).   
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2. Private power, accountability, and legitimacy 
This  section  supports  the  claim  that  global  financial  integration  and  its 
architecture have also bolstered the position of relatively unaccountable private 
market actors in governance at both national and transnational levels.  These 
private actors participate in a narrow and relatively closed policy community 
shared with the ‘non-majoritarian’ state agencies referred to above, in a situation 
which approximates policy capture.  The market-based system as well as the 
debate on architectural reform has therefore tended to reflect the preferences of 
this policy community.  Thus the outcome in terms of financial integration and 
its governance come from a process dominated by a narrow segment of society.  
This  trend  is  part  of  a  broader  reconfiguration  of  the  role  of  states  as  both 
promoters of market-based global integration and managers of the consequences, 
and does not imply that states are in retreat or could not implement alternative 
options.  Once again this presents problems in terms of both the input and the 
output sides of legitimacy.  The question is, can global financial governance be 
adapted  to  accommodate  a  broader  range  of  interests  and  therefore  more 
acceptable norms of governance, or will domestic reactions lead to a suboptimal 
decentralisation around individual national solutions? 
A  legitimate  system  of  financial  governance  in  a  democratic  context, 
appropriate to the imperatives of national economic and political development, 
requires a satisfactory balance of public and particularistic interests.  Historical 
experience  demonstrates  that  if  financial  governance  is  unduly  dominated  by 
profit-seeking private interests, there is a growing risk is of financial crises and  
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problems  for  political  legitimacy.    Although  financial  transactions  in  market-
based  economies  are  largely  private,  the  way  in  which  the  financial  system 
operates as a whole makes it part of the essential infrastructure of any political 
economy, integral to the functioning of other markets, to the political needs of 
states and to the well-being of civil society, such that it must be firmly placed at 
the heart of the public domain.
11  These historical lessons were a priority for the 
1944 Bretton Woods architects, and the agreements sought to ensure that private 
financial  markets  were  at  the  service  of  national  economic  development  and 
public  policy  objectives,  so  that  financial  instability  would  never  again 
undermine the political legitimacy of emerging democratic countries. 
Since then, new policies liberalising domestic financial systems promoted 
cross-border market integration, yielding a system characterised by a high degree 
of  capital  mobility  (Cohen  1999;  Helleiner  1994).
12    These  developments 
represent  a  distinct  change  in  the  normative  consensus  achieved  at  Bretton 
Woods.  With the process of financial globalisation has come a change in the 
balance of power between public authority and private market interests and the 
accompanying transformation in the notion of ‘public interest’ that defines the 
financial order. 
Most  governments  have  responded  to  the  constraints  outlined  in  the 
subsection above by adopting policies which reflect mobile agents’ preferences 
and reinforce the market principles of economic  governance.  Private  market 
actors gain a stronger voice within the political system, often at the expense of 
broader sets of interests.  Authorities have also reacted by adopting ‘market-
based’  approaches  to  regulation,  supervision,  and  corporate  risk  management  
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where  private  firms  are  responsible  for  risk  management  through  complex 
mathematical models implemented under the approval of supervisory agencies 
(e.g. BIS 2006).
13  Crucial information and expertise for the process remains the 
proprietary domain of firms which supervisors admit they cannot match.  In a 
highly  competitive  environment  state  agencies  also  seek  to  improve  market 
opportunities for national players by granting them greater freedom in product 
innovation  and  business  expansion.  This  relative  disarmament  of  public 
authorities  has  implied  that  private  market  interests  increasingly  define 
supervisory criteria, and that the crucial aspect of public policy, the safety and 
stability of the financial system, is dominated by the preferences of those private 
market makers who stand to benefit from it most. 
Perhaps more important is how demands for these new systems emerged and 
were adopted.  Financial firms and their associations have close and relatively 
exclusive relationships with regulatory agencies (for example, supervisors and 
central banks), with frequent delegation to self-regulatory processes.  Most often 
statutorily independent from politicians and other state institutions, regulatory 
agencies are highly responsive to the preferences of private financiers, their main 
domestic political constituencies.  In fulfilling their regulatory and supervisory 
functions, they draw much of their legitimacy, and work in close communion 
with,  these  private  financial  firms.    Regulators  also  collaborate  closely  with 
national  firms  to  adopt  policies  which  promote  competitiveness  in  the 
transnational market place.  These close public-private ties are also reinforced by 
common professional norms, the specialised and technical nature of expertise in 
the financial sector, and the shared need to maintain public confidence in the  
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financial  system  itself.    These  symbiotic  relations,  prevalent  across  the  G7 
leading  economies  (Baker  2005),  not  only  provide  private  interests  with  the 
opportunity to influence the nature of monetary and financial governance, but 
also  the  potential  to  capture  policy-making  and  regulatory  processes.    Clear 
definition of the public interest distinct from the particularistic claims of private 
market actors in relation to the financial system has thus become increasingly 
difficult (Underhill 1995, 1997, 2000).  Private interests allied with powerful 
state  agencies  have  successfully  pushed  for  the  adoption  of  market-friendly 
policies based on their own particularistic preferences.  
Furthermore, these same policy preferences are visible in international co-
operative regimes and policies of the IFIs, indicating that G-7 governments have 
generally backed the preferences of their corporate sectors (Baker 2005) and that 
the  policy  community  is  increasingly  transnational  in  nature.    Market  based 
supervision was promoted by the Group of Thirty, a public-private think-tank 
(Tsingou 2003), and developed by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 
comprised of G-10 bank supervisors and central bank representatives, in close 
co-operation with the private sector lobby group the Institute for International 
Finance (IIF) (Claessens et al, 2003).  Furthermore, co-operative institutions of 
global  financial  governance  such  as  the  Basle  Committee  or  International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), are characterised not only by 
exclusive  policy  communities,  but  also  by  virtual  separation  from  any 
accountable  political  process  (Underhill  1995,  1997),  a    problem  further 
exacerbated by frequent recourse to self-regulation.  As a result, the transnational 
financial  system  is  increasingly  regulated  by  agencies  constituting  de  facto  
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private regimes centred in the financial markets (Cerny 1996, 96-9; Porter 1999), 
to  become  instruments  of  private  economic  interests  rather  than  providers  of 
collective goods.
14   
A  wealth  of  evidence  indicates  that  crucial  multilateral  IFIs  such  as  the 
International Monetary Fund are part of this constellation of interests (Bhagwati 
1998; Wade 1998; Stiglitz 2003a, esp. chs. 1 & 8).  Private institutional investors 
have  attempted  to  shape  the  investment  environment  in  emerging  market 
economies by pressing these economies to adopt policy frameworks favourable 
to their interests (Maxfield 1998; Porter 1999). This pressure is often reinforced 
by ‘advice’ from international financial institutions, especially the IMF, often at 
the moment when emerging market economies are most vulnerable to external 
pressures,  such  as  during  currency  and  financial  crises.  Developing  country 
governments  have  found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  deviate  from  the  policy 
preferences  of  international  financial  markets,  no  matter  how  important 
particular policies may be for resolving their individual problems of economic 
development and socio-political stability.   
Thus  the  emerging  system  of  financial  governance  at  national  and  global 
levels is flawed in important ways in terms of input legitimacy.  The guardians 
responsible  for  making  the  rules  of  the  financial  market  and  governing  the 
monetary and financial order are thus separated off from the traditional means of 
democratic accountability and control as well as influence from broader social 
constituencies.    The  point  here  is  not  that  there  should  be  no  private  sector 
involvement  in  financial  governance.    Close  private  involvement  in  financial 
policy  management,  official  proponents  of  the  new  architecture  claim,  can  
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improve  the  transparency  of  the  public  and  private  sectors,  foster  better  risk 
assessment, and limit moral hazard (Cline 2000; IMF 2001), thus facilitating the 
operation  of  a  market-based  system.    Nor  is  the  argument  that  the  proper 
functioning of private markets, financial or otherwise, is contrary to the public 
interest.  Yet a process encouraging private sector involvement is problematic if 
it fails to represent broader social constituencies, and aligns notions of the public 
interest with reducing risks for those who profit most from financial markets, 
limiting financial governance to technical co-operation to facilitate the market 
relationships. 
The output side of legitimacy has also been flawed.  Financial crisis and the 
difficult policy environment affecting developing countries has been one of the 
principal results of global financial integration.  The decisions made in relatively 
unaccountable  policy  processes  are  often  aimed  at  increasing  the  levels  of 
transnationalisation  and  marketisation  of  economic  policy  making,  benefiting 
private market interests at the expense of the well-being of the general public and 
further  affecting  the  capacity  of  especially  developing  states  to  shape  their 
political economies in line with democratic preferences.  The dénouement of the 
Argentine crisis was the clearest illustration: there IMF conditionality in loan 
negotiations and private sector demands for debt workout directly confronted the 
outcome of democratic elections bringing President Kirchner into office.  The 
outcome was extremely painful for investors and the economy alike, as Kirchner 
largely chose to follow his electoral constituencies. 
Of course, recognised failures in terms of policy outcomes lay behind the will 
of the G-7/10, the IFIs, and a range of governments to debate and engage in the  
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reform of global financial architecture.  Better global governance, in line with the 
arguments in the section on legitimacy above, could have alleviated some of the 
pressures of financial integration.  Yet the results are disappointing, the outcome 
is not likely to be much different, and the reforms have done little to address or 
alleviate  the  legitimacy  deficit.    More  radical  proposals  like  Sovereign  Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) were defeated.  In this sense, the existing 
architecture  for  governing  global  finance  has,  worrisomely,  adopted  a  weak 
approach to the private sector. Focusing narrowly on the technical aspects of 
private involvement but neglecting its normative ramifications, it is most likely 
to be ill-suited to find the right balance between public interests and private gains 
in global financial management. 
The growing dominance of financial governance by narrow private interests 
thus implies clear problems of democratic accountability.  The implication for 
the governance of global finance is clear: the process needs to be more inclusive, 
representing  a  wider  range  of  interests,  and  policy  processes  where  private 
constituencies  threaten  or  manifest  capture  must  be  rendered  accountable  to 
public  authorities.  Need  one  be  reminded  that  international  institutions  and 
policy processes suffer from inherent weaknesses in terms of legitimacy in the 
first place, and that the stakes for states, their societies, and global governance 
are high? 
 
3. Harmonizing pressures and national diversity 
If  the  fundamental  choices  of  states  in  key  areas  of  policy  and  forms  of 
governance are constrained, it follows that they have been increasingly unable to  
  33 
defend  the  norms  and  institutions  that  history  has,  for  better  or  for  worse, 
conferred  upon  them  and  with  which  citizens  understandably  identify.  The 
accelerated  integration  of  national  economies  with  international  financial 
structures  thus  makes  it  difficult  for  states  to  sustain  alternate  models  of 
capitalist development.  Developing states in particular remain vulnerable to the 
aggregate behaviour of global investors who identify their interests with market-
oriented  policies  and  are  able  to  pass  direct  judgement  on  local  policy  and 
business  practices.    This  risk  of  volatile  capital  flows  constitutes  increased 
pressure for the adoption of the norms and standards developed outside the local 
variant of capitalism and compatible with global architecture.  A major plank in 
the reform of global financial architecture was the promulgation of a range of 
“global”  standards  in  the  domains  of  macroeconomic  policy,
15  money 
laundering, financial stability, accounting, and corporate governance (Vojta and 
Uzan 2003).  The process of convergence on these standards is not something 
that can take place overnight and can in itself prove destabilising to already weak 
political economies.  It takes considerable time to develop the administrative and 
political  capacity  to  implement  such  changes  successfully,  with  possible 
unintended consequences (Caprio et al., 2001).  It is unclear that these standards 
are appropriate to developing countries in the first place.   
An obvious source of convergence is regulatory change in financial systems, 
a process which does not take place in a political vacuum.  Indeed, states face 
constant political pressures for regulatory reform at domestic, inter-governmental 
and international levels (Underhill 1999; Vogel 1997).  First and foremost, US 
and European financial institutions have been active in lobbying for deregulation  
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and  aggressive  in  securing  diplomatic  support  for  their  interest  in  access  to 
relatively  closed  developing  country  markets.
16    External  pressures  may  also 
translate into new domestic regulatory preferences as national interest coalitions 
internalise external norms as states seek to attract capital and financial sector 
growth. These demands are often accompanied by domestic lobbies to deregulate 
forms  of  financial  repression  closely  linked  to  a  successful  history  of 
development and political stability.  Such motivation certainly lay behind the 
1980s reforms in many European countries and the 1990s liberalisation efforts 
among the East Asian and Latin American NICs.  Finally, domestic regulators 
may  find  that  their  domestic  firms  are  involved  in  international  transactions, 
becoming drawn into international co-operative  institutions such as the  Basle 
Committee  and  IOSCO,  where  the  preferences  of  developed  G-10  political 
economies prevail over smaller and developing countries (Porter 1999, 2001).  
Furthermore,  by  containing  some  of  the  risks  for  transnational  firms  and 
promoting the norms governing financial market operations, these co-operative 
institutions have played a role in facilitating the liberalisation and integration of 
financial systems. 
The result of these pressures has led to the acceptance and promotion of the 
market-oriented norms, standards, and practices in financial governance, whether 
appropriate to developing countries or not.  If these pressures emanating from the 
G-7  treasuries  (Baker  2005)  can  be  sustained,  one  would  expect  national 
financial  systems  increasingly  to  resemble  each  other  over  time.    Given  that 
many  successful  developing  economies  have  based  their  policies  on  systems 
characterised by financial repression, liberalisation may involve repetition of the  
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serious risks seen with the outbreak of the Asian Crisis (Haggard 2000; Zhang 
2002). 
While regulatory reforms conforming to global standards have precipitated 
changes in financial systems, the impact of global financial structures on state 
policy capacity and on the patterns of corporate governance and behaviour is yet 
more  important  for  convergence.    If  the  transnational  integration  of  financial 
markets  constrains  the  autonomy  of  state  policy  preferences  in  relation  to 
domestic  imperatives,  the  process  also  encourages  states  to  make  national 
markets more friendly to foreign financial institutions seeking an environment 
similar to that at home.  Domestic reforms aimed at convergence on the norms of 
global  financial  architecture  results.  Though  the  degree  of  change  has  varied 
considerably among states, the result has been more market-based and liberal 
systems of economic regulation. 
Similar  motivations  have  led  to  the  reform  and  convergence  of  corporate 
governance practices.  Corporate governance and behaviour, as an integral part 
of any political economy, is closely linked to the type of financial systems and 
the  relationships  between  the  financial  sector,  producer  firms,  labour  market 
practices  and  the  state.  In  order  words,  differences  in  financial  systems  and 
corporate governance are central to what makes different models of capitalism 
different,  and  are  part  of  the  socio-political  compromises  which  have 
characterised a particular political economy over time. Changes in the financial 
system  may  unravel  these  relationships  to  yield  transformations  in  corporate 
governance,  new  (global)  links  between  finance  and  industry,  altered  ties 
between  labour  and  the  employers,  and  thus  a  possible  change  in  the  
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distinguishing features of economic development models themselves.  The rapid 
transformation  of  systems  characterised  by  financial  repression  can  yield 
instability and crisis as well as convergence, further disturbing the social and 
political fabric.  
As inducements for adopting harmonising rules and standards, the IMF has 
given  a  central  role  to  two  major  instruments  of  external  influence—
conditionality  and  policy  surveillance.
17    The  bottom  line  official  consensus 
promotes structural reforms consisting of transparent macroeconomic policies, 
open  financial  markets,  arms-length  bank-industry  ties,  shareholder  model 
Anglo-Saxon-style corporate governance, and market-led industrial adjustment 
strategies.  These norms are argued to be of universal relevance despite national 
historical differences in financial and economic systems. 
While  there  has  been  increased  pressure  for  policy  harmonisation,  the 
convergence of economic models is far from inevitable, and this is part of the 
argument.  Policy-making modes, financial systems and corporate practices are 
deeply embedded in the fabric of local legal, social and economic institutions, 
nationally-defined for the most part at the moment.  Variations among national 
forms of capitalism persist to some degree as each local economy continues to 
refract  external  market  and  political  constraints  in  its  own  way.    Local 
constituencies will resist and may be successful in a number of ways, leaving 
room  for  the  preservation  of  distinctive  national  policies  and  structures  (Hay 
2004; Pauly and Reich 1997).  Historically, few paths to capitalist development 
have  converged  for  long.  The  key  point  is,  where  the  tensions  between 
harmonising liberal market structures and local contexts and institutions become  
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overwhelming, capitalist development and a market-based society as such may 
prove  politically  unsustainable.    If  the  harmonisation  process  conflicts  with 
domestic socio-economic imperatives, the legitimacy of the reform programmes 
promoted by international institutions will be called into question. 
The dynamic is as follows.  Policy convergence to market-oriented policies 
intensifies competition among individual firms and favours multinational firms 
and mobile asset holders over domestically-based enterprises and internationally 
immobile  factors  of  production  (e.g.  labour).  This  will  result  in  considerable 
social and industrial restructuring, which some may well argue is beneficial in an 
aggregate and long-term sense, but involves important short-term costs for more 
vulnerable players.  As their control over the policy environment diminishes vis-
à-vis market forces, states are less able to alleviate the restructuring pains and to 
direct structural adjustment in line with domestic priorities.  Furthermore, these 
effects on the patterns of welfare gains and losses among various societal groups 
pose  a  serious  challenge  to  the  existing  mechanisms  for  income  distribution, 
favouring policies against inflation as opposed to lower unemployment and other 
social  welfare  policies.  The  widespread  efforts  to  increase  the  autonomy  of 
central banks in many emerging markets over the 1990s and the associated tight 
monetary regimes made it difficult for governments to create new jobs; it was the 
poor in general and the unskilled workers in particular who suffered most from 
rising unemployment (Stallings and Peres 2000; Stiglitz 2000, 4-5).   
Cross-country econometric studies have shown that income generated by the 
liberalisation and development of capital markets in developing countries tends 
to accrue almost completely to the top twenty-five percent of the population at  
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the expense of middle and low-income social groups (Das and Mohapatra 2003).   
These perverse redistributive effects of institutional reforms may then undermine 
political  stability  and  growth  prospects  in  developing  and  emerging  market 
countries. Important empirical studies have demonstrated that those developing 
countries that were able to maintain high growth rates in the post-war period 
established effective political systems to manage social conflicts associated with 
market-oriented  reforms  and  provide  the  vulnerable  and  poor  with  adequate 
social insurance (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Rodrik 1998).  In both developed and 
developing countries, complex political and institutional systems have emerged 
over time to manage distributional conflicts with varying degrees of success in 
different historical epochs and national settings.  The contemporary instability of 
continuous adjustment to global market pressures, however,  risks challenging 
these  systems  too  rapidly  for  them  to  survive.  Labour-capital  bargains  in 
European corporatist arrangements or employment-for-life in Japan, for instance, 
are being challenged as regulatory changes and increased capital mobility have 
enabled firms to seek an escape from their costly provisions. To the extent that 
these systems have contributed to socio-political stability and the legitimacy of 
national  governments,  constant  adjustment  to  liberal  market  pressures  and 
structures can sap governments of their political credibility and undermine the 
established patterns of legitimacy in democratic societies. 
The  pressures  for  convergence  described  above  are  cumulative,  and  the 
pressures of transition may be destabilising with disappointing economic results.  
There is thus little hard evidence so far that the end result of convergence would 
be a positive development per se.  Many ‘repressed’ financial systems in Europe  
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and  Asia  proved  themselves  historically  as  policy  instruments  of  tremendous 
efficiency and growth.  The record of the global (and most national) economies 
since the advent of the financial integration process in the late 1970s has fallen 
short relative to the period of national control of money and finance following 
the Second World War  (Crafts  and Mills 1995).  Despite reform, net capital 
flows to developing countries have remained unevenly distributed and volatile 
(frequently negative) over the years (Khaler 1998; World Bank 2006, 180-7), 
while total external debt has remained high (World Bank 2006, 193-9; 201-3).  
Even  the  national  economy  most  successful  at  promoting  global  financial 
integration, the US, only recently emerged in the 1990s as a success story in 
terms of growth, yet has seen dramatic growth in inequalities at the same time 
(Krugman 2002). 
It is difficult to argue that the emergence of the current architecture of global 
finance correlates to a long run improvement in the trend of leading economic 
indicators, to greater levels of financial stability, or to steady and greater access 
to capital for the world’s poorer economies.  The outcome has not been what 
advocates claimed.  Once again, the result may be a decentralisation of global 
governance away from co-operation and towards incompatible sets of national or 
regional preferences.   
One last point: the discussion above is no argument against the introduction 
of sound regulatory and corporate practices, but that international policy-makers 
must  take  local  conditions  into  full  account  when  pressing  for  reforms  in 
emerging  market  countries.  As  it  stands,  however,  the  existing  financial 
architecture  has  made  little  explicit  reference  to  national  legal,  business  and  
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political  practices  and  institutions.  While  recognising  differences  in  national 
financial and economic systems, the architects have not given adequate attention 
to the real and potential conflicts between those differences and their efforts to 
promote policy harmonisation. Nor have they fully realised the implications of 
those conflicts for national economic development and democratic governance. 
In  terms  of  legitimacy,  once  again  a  flawed  process  on  the  input  side, 
representing an exclusive coalition of interests, has resulted in outcomes which 
are in tension with many norms of governance at the domestic level.  That means 
that the norms of contemporary global financial architecture are shared by few, 
which undermines the effectiveness and perhaps the desire for international co-
operation to resolve inevitable collective action problems.  However, that the 
existing  financial  architecture  has  paid  little  attention  to  the  clashes  between 
policy harmonization and national differences and to their economic and political 
consequences represents not benign neglect but deliberate efforts to overhaul the 
institutions of development policies that have been deeply embedded in many 
East  Asian  and  developing  societies.  In  the  wake  of  the  Asian  crisis,  many 
economists of neo-classical persuasion breathed a sign of relief that these once 
successful  exceptions  to  economic  orthodoxy  had  finally  met  their  come-
uppance. For IMF leaders and US Treasury officials, the new architecture has 
been a means of altering the long-standing systems of economic development 
that often proved impenetrable to western corporate entities (Medley 2000).  The 
destructive  effects  of  structural  reforms  on  the  Asian  financial  systems  and 
corporate practices may have been exactly what they hoped for.  
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The architectural reform agenda reflects not only the preferences of major 
financial centres and international institutions but also the interests of their major 
private  sector  constituencies.  The  danger  is  that  structural  reforms  that  have 
catered to the preferences of global investors in the name of ‘sound’ financial 
practices may be implemented at the expense of economic growth and political 
stability in emerging market countries. 
 
IV. Normative Prerequisites for Global Financial Governance 
The  major  argument  developed  in  this  article  is  that  the  technical  aspects  of 
governance,  however  important  to  international  financial  stability,  must  be 
substantively  linked  to  the  political  and  normative  prerequisites  of  global 
governance.  The architectural reform is unlikely to deliver what its proponents 
have  promised  until  the  international  community  has  addressed  these 
prerequisites directly. On the basis of the foregoing assessments, it is proposed 
that the appropriate and necessary modification to the prevailing official agenda 
should have the following features. 
To summarise the findings so far, there are clear problems of legitimacy in 
terms of input/representation and output in global financial governance.  It was 
argued in section I that in international governance, successful results providing 
Easton’s  ‘specific’  legitimacy  are  particularly  important,  given  the  lack  of 
‘diffuse’  legitimacy  of  international  institutions  and  their  distance  from 
traditional means of democratic accountability and community.  But an inclusive 
process  providing  for  the  representation  of  a  broad  range  of  interests  and 
employing a range of representational principles is also crucial for building a  
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sense of shared norms around institutions of global financial governance, a sense 
of  community  and  better  linkages  to  democratic  and  other  accountability 
processes.  Section II pointed out that global governance must leave sufficient 
room for domestic systems and a range of constituencies to adapt and develop 
their  own  solutions,  thus  preventing  atomisation  and  disintegration  of  co-
operative  processes,  in  the  same  way  that  federalism  reduces  the  chance  of 
break-up of complex national communities. 
Contemporary financial architecture fails on all these counts: the results are 
poor,  and  the  process  is  flawed.    The  input  from  emerging  market  and 
developing economies has been at best constrained and marginalised, yielding 
financial governance in severe tension with the interests of these countries, as 
well as some social constituencies in developed countries.  The architecture fails 
to preserve sufficient space for domestic democratic imperatives and choice in 
terms of national development trajectories.  The legitimacy of political choices 
and  governance  derives  from  shared  norms  linked  to  the  accountability  of 
decision-makers  to  constituencies  of  citizens.    In  the  international  system, 
democratic  accountability  may  be  achieved  and  the  legitimacy  of  global 
governance enhanced if states and transnational actors whose actions have an 
impact on the lives of people in other countries could be made more answerable 
to those people (Held 2002).  While accountability can take varying forms, they 
all converge on a basic understanding that rule-makers should be responsible to 
broad publics (Keohane 2002).  Using this basic understanding as a conceptual 
benchmark,  the  accountability  of  many  transnational  actors  involved  in  the 
process  of  global  financial  governance  remains  questionable.  Among  these  
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actors,  powerful  states,  international  organisations,  multinational  corporations 
and inter-governmental and private-sector networks are often deemed the least 
accountable.  Although  some  of  these  agents  may  be  internally  answerable  to 
their own citizens, to member states, their shareholders or network members, 
they are unlikely to be held accountable to people outside their jurisdictions and 
policy spheres (Keohane 2002; Keohane and Nye 2001).  Many developing and 
emerging market societies affected by the policy actions of the US government, 
the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) or Western firms have no direct ability to 
hold these entities accountable.  The influence these actors and organisations 
exert on the making financial governance, combined with their lack of ‘external 
accountability’ (Keohane 2000, 2002) undermines the efficiency and legitimacy 
of  these  rules  and  policies.    While  some  scholars  claim  that  the  growth  of 
supranational, private and technical authority in the process of global governance 
is a positive development for democracy (Porter 2002; Slaughter 2000), credible 
doubt remains. Unless these powerful actors and entities can be held externally 
accountable to broad publics in both developed and developing countries, the 
legitimacy of global financial governance is and will be called into question. 
 
What  is  to  be  done?  In  the  first  place,  national  and  international  policy-
makers should formulate technically effective measures to attenuate the worst 
effects  of  financial  liberalisation  and  capital  mobility.    The  rush  to  capital 
account opening and other forms of liberalisation played a significant role in the 
development  of  financial  and  corporate  difficulties  that  were  to  follow.  
Although there is little evidence that open capital accounts contribute to growth  
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(Stiglitz 2000), and even according to the IMF, capital controls are demonstrably 
effective in certain contexts (IMF 2001), they still remain of the policy menu for 
largely political reasons (Cohen 2003a, 2003b).  Emerging market authorities 
often liberalised rapidly as a result a combination of external pressures from IFIs 
and developed countries with limited understandings of local conditions, plus 
opportunistic pressure from some of their own constituents.  Capital flows were 
liberalised but the necessary institutional mechanisms that might have acted as 
shields against the real and potential dangers of market integration were weak or 
non-existent, forgotten in the reform.  This was a crucial causal factor behind the 
ensuring regional financial turbulence in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere. 
While external policy advisors should avail themselves of the ample evidence 
that local political and institutional factors can make or break reforms, emerging 
market  economies  must  eventually  equip  themselves  better  with  policy 
instruments.  The strong emerging consensus that capital controls should be, and 
indeed are, if implemented with caution, a workable policy instrument (Armijo 
2002; Underhill and Zhang 2003) must find concrete expression in policy, giving 
governments the much-needed running room to compensate for the discretionary 
errors  of  policy  which  all  governments  make,  and,  more  importantly,  for 
financial market volatility.  While few endorse comprehensive capital controls, 
substituting  devices  such  as  use  of  Chilean-style  taxes  on  short-term  inflows 
instead,  proper  restrictions  on  volatile  cross-border  capital  movements  are 
prerequisites for financial stability and sustained economic growth.  Countries 
such  as  China,  India  and  Taiwan  managed  to  escape  the  regional  contagion 
mainly because of the presence of capital controls (Breslin 2003; Joshi 2003;  
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Weiss 2000; Zhang 2003).  Their ‘heterodox’ policy orientations reflected the 
national configuration of state and societal institutions and interests.  Yet the 
resistance  of  the  US  government  and  powerful  global  financiers  has  made 
emerging market governments hesitant to embrace capital controls despite the 
evidence that they can indeed contribute to financial stability.  Cohen (2003b) 
suggests  it  is  necessary  to  build  a  more  effective  transnational  coalition  of 
proponents of capital controls as a legitimate tool of financial governance. 
At the national level, most would argue that stability in the context of high 
capital  mobility  requires  the  adoption  of  enforceable  financial  governance 
standards for a range of public and private actors.  The transparent and consistent 
application of such standards and other legal prerequisites underpin a business 
environment  in  which  market  transactions  may  take  place  without  undue 
externalities  or  market  failure.    Institutional  reforms  have  been  proposed  to 
facilitate  the  implementation  of  e.g.  effective  bank  supervision  and  adequate 
auditing and accounting practices. 
Yet  designing  and  implementing  financial  standards  is  not  without 
difficulties  which  must  be  explicitly  addressed  if  the  policies  are  to  prove 
successful.  National  differences  in  socio-economic  structures  and  institutions 
that  underpin  existing  practices  complicate  the  process  of  identifying  and 
enforcing  minimally  acceptable  standards.    In  addition,  if  one  examines  the 
historical record, developed economies attained success via a wide variety of 
paths to development and with a range of contrasting financial systems (Zysman 
1983).  Most had high doses of financial repression and financial governance 
which was less than a model for the current architecture, one might add.
18  This  
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implies that there should be some latitude for the domestic implementation of 
international  standards  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  sufficient  room  for  local 
practices  and  traditions  and  to  allow  countries  to  reform  by  different  routes. 
Moreover,  there  is  often  entrenched  domestic  resistance  from  politically 
powerful actors who identify their interests with the status quo and thus attempt 
to convince regulators to interpret international standards generously.  Given the 
high political stakes involved, global financial standards should be implemented 
cautiously  and  domestic  political  and  institutional  constraints  taken  seriously, 
allowing  diversity  in  national  market  systems  and  development  models  and 
yielding  slower  reform  but  better  long-run  results  for  emerging  market 
economies.  The focus should be on ensuring functional equivalence of particular 
reform  principles  in  specific  contexts,  not  on  a  universal  model.    Socially 
optimal  compensatory  schemes  and  negotiating  mechanisms  should  be 
established  or  reinforced  in  order  to  co-opt  opposition  to  the  reforms.    The 
pursuit of micro policy innovations and associated institutional adjustments must 
be  rendered  compatible  with  the  defining  features  of  national  economic 
governance and patterns of development in emerging markets.  This extends to 
developing countries the same luxury which G-7 governments, especially the US 
administration  and  Congress,  jealously  guard,  remembering  that  their  own 
reform programmes happened over decades, and there were important mistakes 
made  along  the  way.    The  more  intensive  the  process  of  global  financial 
integration becomes, the maintenance of micro-macro linkages will be all the 
more essential to the efficacy of democratic governance. 
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If  countries  with  enduring  difference  in  national  economic  models  are  to 
accept  the  costs  which  accompany  these  micro-macro  linkages,  then  the 
institutions  of  global  financial  governance  must  command  across  their 
membership in their limited policy domains compliance similar to that achieved 
by domestic authorities in a national context.  This implies mechanisms to deal 
with  sovereign  bankruptcy  which  command  all  parties,  including  rogue 
creditors.
19    That  also  means  compliance  from  those  countries  whose 
macroeconomic  policies  entail  major  destabilising  international  payments 
imbalances  such  as  the  US  at  the  moment,  not  just  countries  afflicted  with 
‘original sin.’  This is most likely a major sticking point, as national governments 
display  little  enthusiasm  for  initiatives  that  would  further  compromise  their 
policy autonomy. 
The  problem  of  co-ordinating  compliance  across  such  national  diversity 
implies  the  importance  of  regional  co-operative  processes  for  managing  the 
global monetary and financial system.  As Hveem argues, regional solutions may 
be more effective than the nation-state on its own, with more potential legitimacy 
and collective identity than global institutions, thus perhaps more economically 
and  politically  optimal  in  terms  of  policy  efficacy  the  sacrifice  of  national 
prerogatives  (Hveem  2005,  301).    At  the  regional  level,  emerging  market 
governments  may  be  more  prepared  to  establish  collective  mechanisms  for 
dealing with systemic instability, and may have more incentives to co-ordinate 
macro-economic policy, follow common rules over capital flows, contribute to 
the  provision  of  contingency  liquidity,  and  apply  peer  pressure  to  ensure 
compliance.  
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Structural reforms to facilitate governance at the national, regional, or global 
level involve a mix of official and private-sector actors and their interactions 
with  public  authorities  at  national  and  international  levels.    While  private 
financial sector expertise can enhance governance, firms benefit the most from 
the  market  order  whilst  their  financial  transactions  pose  ongoing  risks  to  the 
public interest.  By implication, they should share the costs of crisis prevention, 
management,  and  bail-out,  just  as  they  benefit  more  than  most  in  times  of 
growth.  While in most developed economies this has been accomplished at the 
national level, albeit not without a history of contestation, at the global level the 
obligations of firms are much less clear.  To engage private actors and firms in 
responsible  financial  policy,  a  politically  sustainable  balance  between  public 
authority  and  private  power  should  be  an  explicit  concern  of  the  reform  of 
financial architecture.  The ongoing potential for capture analysed in the public 
choice literature, and the empirical evidence presented above of real dangers of 
private capture of the policy process suggests that the clear definition of public 
interests  distinct  from  the  necessarily  particularistic  claims  of  private  market 
actors is the key to ensuring the predominance of the public good in the financial 
system.  Maintaining  strong  public  oversight  and  control  over  private  agents 
moreover implies effective subordination of private financial firms to democratic 
institutions and processes across levels of governance. 
This involves looking closely at the policymaking autonomy of regulatory 
agencies from national to global levels.  Where autonomous public agencies such 
as  financial  supervisors  with  delegated  mandates  maintain  close  interactive 
linkages to private financial firms and associations prone to particularistic rent- 
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seeking, governments should establish effective monitoring mechanisms in order 
to ensure accountability to their representatives and the electorate (Campos and 
Root 1997, 153-71; Haggard 1999).  The power of private actors and potential 
for capture in situations of delegated authority should also be counteracted by 
including a broader range of social groups in these public policy processes and 
by  fashioning  more  inclusive  state-society  relations  (Biddle  and  Milor  1997; 
Evans  1997).    Such  inclusion  will  more  likely  lead  to  outcomes  based  on 
broader, shared norms in policy-making.   Empirical evidence appears to cast 
doubt on traditional concerns that the inclusion of more social groups leads to the 
emergence of “distributive coalitions” and impairs policy efficacy (Campos & 
Nugent 1999; McCallum & Blais 1987; Unger & van Waarden 1999).  These 
studies  suggest  that  the  expansion  of  interest  groups  associated  with 
democratisation  does  not  necessarily  constitute  a  threat  to  growth-oriented 
policies, and that the relative organisational strength of business vis-à-vis other 
social groups (Lindblom 1977, 348-56) may prove less problematic if the state 
institutionalises interactive processes bringing civil society and labour together 
with private firms.  To ensure the responsiveness of architectural reforms to the 
countries  and  peoples  most  affected  by  the  reforms,  key  regional  and 
international  financial  institutions  should  engage  actively  with  transnational 
social forces (Held 1995; Woods 2001).  
This  raises  the  problem  of  representation  as  an  element  of  legitimacy  as 
discussed  in  section  I.    Different  principles  of  representation  accomplish 
different  goals  in  political  communities.    The  point  once  again  is  that  input 
legitimacy  could  be  substantially  enhanced  through  better  and  broader  
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representation based on a range of principles, thus increasing the likelihood that 
a  more  acceptable  spectrum  of  norms  came  to  be  shared  in  global  financial 
governance.  At the moment and to cite a specific example, representation in the 
BWIs is arguably based almost entirely on the not-very-democratic shareholder 
principle: who pays the piper, calls the tune.  Even on this basis, a range of 
developing countries are grossly  and systematically under-represented on this 
basis  and  a  range  of  (particularly  European)  developed  countries  are 
considerably over-represented.
20  There could also be more control for size of 
population in voting systems, enhancing the voice of citizens of developing and 
transition countries representing some 84% of global population (Buira 2005). 
Other principles of representation could also be included in the system.  At 
their founding, BWI member countries had proportionately much higher “basic 
votes” or one-member-one-vote elements in their votes, but quota increases have 
augmented  the  shareholder  principle.    Basic  votes  could  be  strengthened  in 
relative  terms.    Furthermore,  systematic  the  representation  of  “users”  on  the 
board  could augment the representation of those with an ongoing adjustment 
programme.    In  this  sense,  debtors  subject  to  conditionality  as  users  of  IMF 
services would receive more equal representation relative to developed country 
creditors,  recognising  that  the  causes  and  costs  of  debt  crises  are  a  shared 
responsibility, and that the poor in debtor countries probably bear the brunt of 
adjustment.    A  broader  range  of  “corporatist”  social  partners  across  the 
membership could be explicitly represented.  Finally, the minorities, the poorest 
mostly Africa economies subject to almost continuous IMF programmes since 
the 1960s could receive enhanced representation on the basis of the minority  
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rights principle.  No political community is arguably legitimate without serious 
protections for minorities, and this ‘minority’ is also the most consistent ‘user’ or 
‘debtor’.  
Linking  a  broad  mix  of  these  enhanced  modes  of  representation  to 
institutions  of  global  financial  governance  with  more  developed  political  and 
administrative resources at regional and global levels is part of what has become 
known as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’.  By pooling sovereignty, attenuating the 
raw exercise of state and private corporate power through co-operative financial 
governance,  ‘cosmopolitan  democracy’  can  attenuate  some  of  the  legitimacy 
deficit  at  the  same  time  as  it  helps  individual  states  to  confront  the  tensions 
created by financial globalisation.
21 This is of course easier said than done, and 
would certainly run into the fierce opposition of transnational corporate interests, 
which  most  enjoy  the  freedoms  of  global  markets.  Equally  important,  co-
operative governance and the required abrogation of national prerogatives may 
be the most difficult hurdle (especially for the strong) in the development of 
(democratic) institutions of accountability at regional and global levels. These 
difficulties, however, do not diminish the potential advantages of the successful 
operation  of  cosmopolitan  democracy,  at  the  same  time  as  current  efforts  at 
reforming global financial architecture fail to address the problems identified in 
the previous section.  In the end, as at Bretton Woods, some resolution of the 
socio-political  tensions  and  legitimacy  problems  associated  with  financial 
integration on the domestic front is needed, as are legitimate forms of global 
financial governance.   
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The G-20 and the Financial Stability Forum, in which only a dozen emerging 
market countries are included, have not produced genuine results to address the 
central concerns of the majority of developing countries (Akyüz 2000; Griffith-
Jones,  Ocampo  and  Cailloux  1999;  Woods  2001).  Any  decisions  made 
concerning  the  financial  architecture  are  unlikely  to  have  wide  and  lasting 
effects. The greater participation of developing countries and their societies is 
indispensable for their governments to justify the economic and social costs of 
structural  reforms  and  to  create  the  incentive  for  implanting  international 
standards and practices within the national political economy. In order for the 
reform  agenda  to  become  more  legitimate  and  therefore  more  achievable, 




The analysis in this article has supported three propositions: i) that the external 
constraints of the global financial system are in tension with a range of potential 
domestic,  particularly  democratic,  political  imperatives;  ii)  global  financial 
integration encouraged by developed states has strengthened the hand of private 
interests in the policy process, further constraining the definition of the public 
interest in a democratic context; iii) market-friendly institutional reforms both 
domestic  and  global  put  pressure  on  domestic  socio-political  arrangements 
underpinning  longer  run  political  legitimacy  and  sustainability  of  financial 
governance.  Addressing these underlying problems requires explicit attention to 
the normative dimensions of financial governance.   
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The ten-year process of reform to contemporary financial architecture has 
fallen short of a fundamental restructuring of the ways in which global finance is 
governed,  resulting  in  significant  legitimacy  deficits  on  the  input  and  output 
sides.  Although the new architecture has been deeply concerned with national 
policy changes, it has seldom confronted the political and institutional factors 
that underlie the substance or implementation of policy. While private market 
actors  and  agencies  are  increasingly  integrated  into  international  policy 
processes, the issue of a politically sustainable balance between public authority 
and private power at national and international levels has been ignored along 
with inequality and justice questions. 
The argument here is that political legitimacy and democratic accountability 
constitute  the  real  bottom  line  when  it  comes  to  the  normative  constructs  of 
international financial architecture.  If the system of financial governance and the 
conditionality  governing the adjustment process conflict  consistently  with the 
mandates  of  democratically-elected  governments  and  the  requirements  of 
domestic political stability, then the process of global financial integration and 
the architecture/policies which underpin it may be called into question or indeed 
unravel.  This was certainly the case subsequent to the crisis of 1929 and the 
rapid disintegration of the international economic system, followed by a descent 
into political ugliness in a number of societies and eventual war.  While the 
situation  today  is  not  as  urgent,  a  number  of  countries  already  appear  to  be 
searching  for  alternatives.    Without  legitimacy,  citizens’  frustrations  with 
democratic governance will deepen, extreme political movements intensify and 
global  markets  and  institutions  retreat  (Pauly  1995,  1997,  chapter  7;  Strange  
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1998).  Further integration of financial markets and the reform of global financial 
architecture should proceed cautiously so as to avoid a mass check-out from the 
‘Hotel  Capital  Mobility’,  leading  to  a  situation  where  the  collective  action 
necessary  for  the  successful  governance  of  the  financial  system  becomes 
impossible, with heavy costs for all in the global system.   
 
                                                 
1 For more recent official discussions, see IMF (2003, 2005). 
2 See recent contributions by Kahler and Lake (2003), Soederberg (2004). 
3 A few exceptions include Leslie Elliott Armijo (2003) and Susanne Soederberg (2003).  
4 In the following discussion on legitimacy, the authors would like to acknowledge the research 
assistance of Emile Yesodharan, and the research project and MA thesis of Sylvia Tijmstra 
(2002), the supervision and completion of which inspired much of this discussion. 
5 Prominent examples of econometric studies that lend support to the claim are Dani Rodrik 
(1997a; 1997b, chapter 4). The claim tends to be contested by Geoffrey Garrett (2000), and is 
qualified by Mosely (2000). 
6  There  is  considerable  literature  that  establishes  the  impact  of  economic  and  financial 
globalisation on the widening gap of wealth and income within both developed and developing 
countries.  See,  for  example,  Hurrell  and  Woods  (1999),  Dennis  Quinn,  (1997),  Jeffrey  G. 
Williamson (1996). 
7 The general claim that financial integration reduces the redistributive role of corporate taxation 
is qualified by Garret’s econometric analysis,  which shows that the effects of integration on 
capital taxation are contingent on the partisan balance of power. See Geoffrey Garret (2000, 130-
6). 
8 See volume edited by Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2005. 
9 Global financial integration is therefore not seen here as an alien phenomenon but as the result 
of deliberate policy led by interest coalitions within G-7/10 economies, embraced in uneven 
measure by developing countries, and largely supported by multilateral institutions. 
10  It  is  acknowledged  that  the  relationship  between  financial  globalisation  and  democracy  is 
necessarily complicated and defies simple and linear depiction. For a more nuanced treatment, 
see Sylvia Maxfield (1998). 
11  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  on  the  notion  of  the  pubic  domain  and  corresponding 
interpretations of the public interest in relation to the financial order, see Underhill (2000).  
12 The domestic and international factors that prompted financial policy changes are not dealt 
with here. Relevant discussions of these factors include Goodman and Pauly (1993), Helleiner 
(1994), and Underhill (1991). 
13 Some analysts cast serious doubts on whether market-based supervisory methods will lead to 
stability at all; e.g. see Persaud (2000).  
14  Thomas  Oatley  and  Robert  Nabors  (1998)  document  how  the  original  Basle  Accord  was 
created to respond to the rent-seeking demands of private financial firms in leading industrial 
nations. 
15 See IMF Reports on Observance of  Standards and Codes for various countries.  
16 This sort of pressure was greatly enhanced by the advent of and eventual conclusion of the 
WTO agreement on the liberalisation of trade in financial services (Dobson and Jaquet 1998). 
17 The pros and cons of these instruments are examined at length in Devesh Kapur and Richard 
Webb (2000). 
18 See e.g. Moran’s (1986) account of the esoteric and anything but transparent nature of financial 
governance in the UK up to the end of the 1970s, or Bagehot’s historic account Lombard Street.  
Neither Japan’s nor Germany’s financial sectors historically corresponded to the model  
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propounded by the contemporary financial architects, not to mention France, Italy, Korea, 
Taiwan, China, or a range of other highly successful economies.  There was little regulation in 
the historically volatile and decentralised US financial system (Salley 2001), and financial 
repression was an important feature of US post-depression period, only slowly dismantled from 
the 1970s.  It is difficult to think of a case of successful economic development based on the 
model propounded by current financial architecture. 
19 One thinks here of the failed SDRM and other proposals. 
20 In terms of purchasing power parity, transition plus developing countries constitute the same 
share of world GDP as the G7, yet the G7 still has well over half of the IMF votes (Buira 2005). 
21 ‘Cosmopolitan democracy’ as a regional and global solution to the democratic deficit caused 
by economic globalisation is elaborated in James Bohman (1999) and David Held (1995, 267-
82). On accountability, see Robert O. Keohane (2001).  
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